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       COLLATERAL CHALLENGE AND ENFORCEMENT NOTICES  (1)
 Cet animal est tres mechant-quand on l'attaque, il se defend  (2)
Notorious were the fruitless labours of the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge in
steadfastly advocating a distinction between fancy  and  the imagination - an
endeavour   in semantics which  was always unconvincing (3)   Echoes of this
kind of sophistry resonate in the very recent  decision of the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) in R v. Wicks (4)  which  seeks  to resurrect, (5)    a
supposed dichotomy  between the nullity and invalidity of an enforcement
notice.  Unlike Coleridge's metaphysics, such  esoteric and outmoded  analysis
has significant practical consequences in the planning context which may prove
injurious to the interests of developers who find themselves the victims of
enforcement proceedings, and who wish to challenge them collaterally.  (6)
This is so because  R v. Wicks limits the circumstances in which the invalidity
of an enforcement notice can be raised as a defence in a criminal trial.
Developers seeking to challenge the vires of the notice will often be forced to
undertake expensive High Court litigation if a conviction is to be avoided. (7)
Strict limitations on the availability of this procedure may mean that such
recourse is not always possible.
In R v. Wicks a  developer had unsuccessfully appealed against the issue of an
enforcement notice, and no further appeal was  instituted before the High
Court.  Subsequently,  when prosecuted,  he elected for trial at  the Crown
court. His defence sought to challenge the  notice on vires grounds by asserting
that it was unreasonable and , further, that it had been issued in bad faith.   The
learned judge ruled that unless the notice was bad on its face, the matters
alleged could not be  pleaded by way of defence at the trial since, as a matter of
public law,  the  exclusive  procedure for making that challenge was  by way of
judicial review.  The  defendant then pleaded guilty.
The learned judge granted a certificate of fitness for appeal of which the
principal ground was whether it was appropriate to challenge the decision to
issue an enforcement notice on Wednesbury grounds (8)  (irrelevant
considerations, perversity, bad faith) by way of a defence to an indictment.   In
its  judgment, the Court of Appeal, following the earlier decision  in   Bugg v.
DPP (9)  decided that this defence was an abuse of the process of court.  It held
that in a  defence to a prosecution for breach of an enforcement notice a
2defendant can only  plead  that the enforcement notice  is   ex facie  a nullity .
In other  cases, where what is alleged is that the defect is other than an ex facie
defect, for example that the decision to issue an enforcement notice was
unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense,   the allegation can only be  made by
way of an application for judicial review in  separate proceedings.   The Court
labelled  these "invalidity" (as opposed to "nullity") cases.
The distinction  between nullity and invalidity  was held to be important
because in the   latter type of case (that is, one of "invalidity"- a Wednesbury
type  challenge) evidence would be required to establish the defect, and the
criminal courts would not be suited to these issues.  Lay justices in particular
might find difficulties in applying the principles of an area of law which has
been regarded as "complex". (10)   For example, it was held that an assertion
that the enforcement notice  was unreasonable would involve a consideration of
planning policy and other evidence not suited to a criminal trial.
 In sum, the controlling principle  enshrined in this judgment is thus that there is
a distinction between nullity and invalidity.  An ex facie defect is capable of
rendering the enforcement notice a nullity. This is a matter which can be
pleaded in criminal proceedings.  A matter going merely to invalidity is a
matter which must be raised by way of judicial review.   The defendant must
then apply for a stay of the criminal proceedings and seek leave  for judicial
review.   This clearly necessitates the cost of separate High Court proceedings
(within the strict three months time limit).
More fundamentally, the decision in R v. Wicks prevents the recipient of an
enforcement notice from making a challenge to its vires as a matter of right:
judicial review proceedings are subject to the discretionary leave stage, and any
remedies available are themselves  a matter of discretion.  This is not normally
so in the case of a defence in a criminal trial which  can be advanced as a
matter of right.
 R v. Wicks is open to challenge on two grounds: (i) it is an unwarranted
extension of the O' Reilly v. Mackman principle; (11)  and (ii) it  ignores well-
establish decisions which hold that where a decision is perverse or tainted by
irrelevancy or otherwise challengeable on Wednesbury grounds the error goes
to jurisdiction  and decision in question which is a nullity. It is void ab initio
and not merely voidable (i.e. "invalid" in the sense meant by the Court of
3Appeal).  There are no degrees of nullity. This, as will be discussed below,  is  a
fundamental orthodoxy.
O' Reilly v. Mackman
It will be recalled that in O' Reilly v. Mackman  it was Lord Diplock who, in an
ex cathedra judgment in which the whole House concurred, established  the
presumptive exclusivity of judicial review proceedings  in matters of public
law.  Where a public law issue is at stake the matter must normally be raised by
way of an application for judicial review  in the High Court.  (12)
The rationale for this ruling is stated to be that in an application for judicial
review leave is required,  and this procedural device affords important
protection  to public administration.   Since, at the leave stage, the application is
made ex parte by the applicant, the  local planning authority is not required to
bear the expense and inconvenience of raising a defence until the applicant has
shown that an arguable case exists. Further,  the performance of public duties is
a matter in which the public has an interest and this interest must be considered
amongst other matters before the administration is subject to the delays and
uncertainties of litigation.  This procedural device is thus seen as an important
protection for public bodies in filtering out vexatious and unwarranted claims.
In addition to the leave stage there is also the further  protection afforded by the
strict time limit for judicial review which is also intended to provide certainty in
public administration. (13)    It is considered important that this protection
should not be circumvented by selecting alternative means of asserting public
law matters.  This is the  sub silentio  reasoning underlying the Court of
Appeal's decision  in  R v. Wicks.
Whilst the general rule enunciated in  O' Reilly is relatively straightforward, the
aftermath  of the decision has been confounded by uncertainty  since  Lord
Diplock's ventured to establish exceptions to the rule. These exceptions permit
certain public law matters to be asserted outside the judicial review procedure.
Falling within this exceptional category are cases where  "the invalidity of the
decision arises as a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a right of the
plaintiff arising under private law, or where none of the parties object to the
4adoption of the procedure by writ or originating summons".   (14)   Presently
we are concerned with the first of these exceptions.
Collateral Pleas   (15)
It is important to be clear that even in O' Reilly itself the possibility of collateral
challenge was not seen to be abrogated by the general rule .  The problem has
been to understand the sense in which Lord Diplock used the  term "collateral".
According to one view, he used the term in the sense in which it is used in this
paper. A public law issue would arise collaterally in    proceedings  not
specifically designed to resolve  such issues, such as where magistrates are
asked to convict a developer for breach of an enforcement notice.  The
applicant would only then have to proced by way of judicial review where  no
private rights was  at stake.   This intepretation, if correct, still  creatres
uncertainty about the challenge to enforcement notices because  the planning
legislation has removed private legal rights to develop land.   A counter
argument might be that such collateral challenge is permitted because a
developer prosecuted under an invalid enforcement notice is affected in his
private rights in so far as he risks the imposition of a fine.
But there is another, narrower, interpretation of  Lord Diplock's judgment
which descibes a public law issue as arising collaterally where it is not the
central issue in the case. (16)  Only cases in which private law issues dominate
would the case be heard outside the judicial review procedure.   If this
interpetation is correct the question is whether in the present context private
law issues can be said to dominate?
 The first issue, of course is: which of these intepretationsof Lord Diplock's
exception is  is correct? According to one  view,  the former, wider
interpretation   is correct and, indeed, necessary interpretation of the reformed
RSC Ord 53 which sought only  to effect procedural changes to the application
for judicial review.  Since collateral challenges are not themselves applications
for review they cannot have been affected by the introduction of the new RSC
Ord. 53.  (17)     The opportunity to consider the matter came before   the House
of Lords in Roy v. Kensington & Chelsea & Westminster Family Practitioners'
Committee  (18)  but unfortunately, their lordships   declined to resolve the
confusion.  However, Lord Lowry expressed a clear preference for the former,
broad approach.  This is not enough to remove the uncertainty as to whether
5Lord Diplock's exception permits the raising of a public law defence  outside
the application for judicial review.
However, the existence and value of the wider interpretation of collateral
challenge exception seemed to have been  recognised and applied in the
important case of   Wandsworth LBC v. Winder. (19)    Here the facts were that
a local authority tenant   did not  succeed in obtaining  leave to challenge the
vires of a rent increase.  Subsequently, in county court proceedings, the local
authority sought to recover possession and arrears of rent from the tenant who
had maintained his refusal to pay the increase.
Notwithstanding the general rule established in  O' Reilly,  the tenant's defence
was not  struck out.  This was so because  the public law issue (the validity of
the resolution increasing the rent) was capable of affording the tenant a
defence to the claim against him  and it was unjust to deprive the tenant of that
defence.   No objection was taken either to the suitability of the county court as
a forum for the determination of  public law issues, nor to the possible
evidential difficulties in resolving  such issues despite the  significance attached
to these issues in Wicks.
However the importance of the decision in the present context is somewhat
diminished  because Lord Fraser did not regard it as falling within the collateral
exception at all.  He  preferred insead to distinguish O' Reilly   on the grounds
that (i) the respondent was claiming a breach of a contractual right ; and (ii) he
was not to be penalised where he had not been responsible for the choice of
forum.
 A further difficulty arose when the Divisional Court in Quietlynn v. Plymouth
City Council (20)  refused to allow a collateral challenge in criminal
proceedings partly on thee grounds that the criminal courts lack competence to
deal with complex issues of public law.  Conflict in the authorities was then
established when the Divisional Court in R v. Reading Crown Court ex p
Hutchinson (21)  rejected the reasoning in Quietlynn.  It recognised the
fundamental importance of not forcing upon members of the public the
invidious decision when confronted by ultra vires administrative action    either
to take expensive High Court proceedings (in addition to the costs incurred in
mounting a defence to a civil or criminal matter) or to abandon their
6civil/criminal defence entirely because it would  not be a matter arguable
outside judicial review proceedings.
In  Reading  the defendants  were permitted to argue that the bye-laws were
ultra vires the enabling statute  in prosecutions for their alleged violation.
They persuasively argued that it should be open to them to challenge a bye-law
in the magistrates' court since bye-laws, like  local justices, are part of a system
of local administration. Furthermore,  it was unjust to require them to incur the
significant expense of separate judicial review proceedings where all that was
intended was an "appeal" against a  small fine.
 However, decisions like Winder (regardless of its scope)   have not found
support with some senior members of the judiciary and in particular Lord
Woolf who, writing extra -judicially  has stated that the Winder decision  in
effect erodes the  safeguards of the O' Reilly principle. (22)    Given his
forthright views it is hardly surprising that Lord Woolf should seek to narrow
its scope as well as that of exceptions to the O' Reilly principle.   The
opportunity to do so arose in Bugg v. DPP  (23)  which was later cited with
approval by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)  in  R v. Bovis
Construction Ltd. (24)  It was the decision  in Bugg v. DPP  upon which so
much reliance was placed  in R v. Wicks.   Here (in Bugg) Woolf L.J. (as he
then was) criticised the reasoning in cases like Hutchinson for overlooking
different types of invalidity case, only some of which were suited to resolution
in the criminal process.  (25)
The proper distinction to be drawn, it was held, was between "substantive" and
"procedural" defects.   "Substantive" defects amounting to defects on the face
of the notice could be the subject of collateral challenge, but not  "procedural"
defects.  The former (a "substantive" defect) would arise  where the bye-law
were outwith the power pursuant to which it was made, or if it were patently
unreasonable, and the latter (a "procedural" defect) would arise if the
enforcement notice was  successfully impugned on the grounds that  the
enacting authority had failed  to comply with a procedural requirement
governing its  enactment.  (26)    This analysis leaves many questions affecting
these definitions unresolved, but for present purposes it suffices to note that
postulated the dichotomy operates at two levels:  doctrinal and evidential.
7First, at the doctrinal level, the purported distinction between "substantive" and
"procedural"  error ignored the orthodoxy that  both types of  error are errors
going to jurisdiction resulting in the nullity of the decision impugned.  The
recognition that this was so  was precisely  the significant advance made by the
House of Lords in the landmark decision in Ridge v. Baldwin (27)    Lord
Woolf flatly contradicted this by asserting   that procedural error is not now to
be regarded as a matter of excess or abuse of power. (28)  With respect to his
lordship  this is  simply untenable.
At a more practical level,  the Court in  Bugg stressed that "procedural" defects
required to be established, as a matter of evidence,  by a different means than
"substantive" defects.  The court held that since  the authority responsible for
enacting the by-law would not be a party to a criminal prosecution it would be
denied the opportunity of defending the procedure leading to the enactment of
the notice.   The court would therefore be unable to decide the issue for lack of
sufficient evidence.  No such problem would arise in the case of  "substantive"
ultra vires  because the question could be  resolved by an examination of the
bye-law and the enabling enactment.
 The Court of Appeal in R v. Wicks attempted to adopt this doctrinal heresy and
extend its effects.  It adopted  the  practical distinction forged in Bugg between
different kinds of  issue in which invalidity is raised  (some requiring to be
proved by extrinsic evidence,  and others where the error could be established
by a straightforward examination of documents)   but  re-defined the doctrinal
distinction by disapproving  Lord Woolf's  dichotomy between "substantive"
and "procedural" defects.  The true distinction to be drawn, it held, was
between   invalidity and nullity.   A  defect  resulting in "nullity" can be pleaded
as a defence in a criminal matter  as of right. The court will then declare the
decision ultra vires and void.  "Nullity" cases are broadly those  which Lord
Woolf labelled "substantive" but excluded bad faith.  In all other cases wherer it
is alleged   that instrument is  ultra vires the result is mere "invalidity"   Here
the matter cannot be raised outside judicial review, and judicial review is not
available to any applicant as a matter of right.
As a result of this ruling,  where leave is refused (for example, on the grounds
of delay), the impugned administrative action will not be quashed; it will
remain effective in law and the accused will have no choice but to plead guilty.
8This is so notwithstanding that an essential element in the offence charged (the
enforcement notice)  is ultra vires.
This analysis is, of course, to resurrect the pre- Ridge v. Baldwin  (29)   reliance
upon a supposed distinction between void and voidable administrative action.
(30)     It  utters the same heresy as was heard  in Bugg because it assumes that
an administrative authority can commit an errors of law and remain within its
jurisdiction.  It is now accepted that the effect of the House of Lords decision in
the Anisminic case  was that all errors of law go to jurisdiction.  (31)
 However, it is also a matter of some concern that  R v. Wicks is not a loyal
application of Bugg but an  extension of it.   Under Bugg a bye-law tainted by
mala fides (32)   was held to be capable of collateral challenge, that is, by way
of a defence in criminal proceedings.  The recipient could thus wait until
prosecuted and plead the invalidity by way of a defence either in the Crown
court or before local justices. This is so because under Lord Woolf's analysis
the defect was apparently deemed to be "substantive" and not merely
"procedural".  Paradoxically,  the obvious need for the defence to adduce
evidence to prove bad faith was not  thought to be a problem even though this
was precisely the reason why "procedural" defects could not be pleaded.
The reservation of the possibility of a challenge on the grounds of bad faith was
dismissed as an obiter dictum in  R v. Wicks where it was held that all defences
raising  Wednesbury type  issues, relevancy, and bad faith  must be  established
by way of proceedings for judicial review.
This draconian application of the post RSC Ord 53 principle procedural
exclusivity is not without  serious pitfalls for both developers and legal
advisers.  The strictly applied time limit of three months  (33)  means that in a
judicial review would probably not be available to a developer who waited until
the criminal trial only then to discover the effect of the ruling in R v. Wicks  and
the consequent need to apply for judicial review.  In such a case it is  likely that
it would be too late to comply with the time limit, which would not normally
be extended.
The arguments raised  in R v. Wicks, Bugg and  Quitlynn to defend this grave
position  in which public interest considerations trump the right to make a
defence in a criminal trial  focus on two central  issues.
91.    That raising a public law matter by way of defence in a criminal matter
would be beyond the reasonable capacity of the criminal process.     This raises
three subordinate objections none  of which is convincing.
(a)  The expertise of the criminal court.  It has been stated that confronted with
"complex" questions of public law are not equiped to deal with them. (34)
Moreover, the protection available to public bodies in judicial review includes
the expertise of specialist public law judges only available on judicial review.
The problem with these arguments is that they are  applied selectively.  Lay
justices are required to confront difficult and complex issues of law as a part of
their jurisdiction.  One only has to recall the possible impact of EC law on s.47
of the Shops Act 1950. (35)  This was also an issue about which different
courts might reach different conclusions, but it was never suggested that  this
matter should be removed from the magistrates' jurisdiction.
(b)  The need for evidence.  In  Wicks and Bugg it will be recalled that   a
dichomtomy was to be forged according to whether evidence was needed to
prove the invalidity alleged.  Merely because evidence is required does not
make it a matter suitable for judicial review.  Indeed, the reverse could apply.
If, for example,  there were a factual dispute,   the ordinary civil and criminal
courts  would be more equipped to deal with such matters   than judicial review
with its limited scope for discovery and cross examination. (36)  The argument
on suitability of the criminal process is also weakened by Lord Justice Woolf's
admission  that cases of mala fides would be suited to collateral attack even
though evidence would be required to establish liability.
(c)    Parties.
It has also been objected that the defendant local authority reponsible for the
enforcement notice would not be before the court to defend it when its validity
was in question. (37)   The answer to this is that the local planning authority
can be  required to give evidence before the justices in support of the notice.
In civil proceedings it is possible to make a public authority a party. An analogy
is provided by   Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham (38) where banks were
joined as parties their right to enforce the impugned transactions might be at
issue.
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2.   Certainty.
This argument  suggests that if a bye-law could be challenged in criminal
proceedings different courts might reach different decisions about its validity at
different times. As Feldman argues  (39)  a similar risk exists in relation to
substantive challenge  (or "nullity" cases) even if they are considered on
judicial review because of the indeterminacy of the very principles of judicial
review.
However, if  there is  force in this argument, it cannot apply in the case of an
enforcement notice which takes effect in personam. Consistency is not an issue.
  
Collateral Challenge Before and After RSC Ord. 53.
The most fundamental objection to R v. Wickes and Bugg  is that no  practical
or procedural objection was ever raised to the questioning of the validity of
bye-laws (or enfporcement notices) on the grounds of unreasonableness;
indeed, this possibility has been admitted at least since R v. Rose ex p Wood
(40)    where the decision of the stipendiary magistrate to inquire into the
validity of a bye-law on the grounds that it had been confirmed by the Secretary
of State was quashed by the Divisional Court on the grounds that there is no
jurisdiction to enforce a bad bye-law.  This ruling was confirmed in the
classical decision in Kruse v. Johnson. (41)  and interpreted by Lloyd L.J. in R
v. Reading Crown Court ex p Hutchinson (42)  as imposing a duty on the
justices to inquire  whether an order under which a conviction is sought is valid.
The  argument that the jurisdiction (or possibly duty) to entertain collateral
challenge has been curtailed by the decision in O' Reilly v. Mackman and the
procedural changes to Ord 53 are unconvincing.  It is difficult to understand
that a procedural reform of civil law could have swept away the right of an
accused person to mount a defence in a criminal trial.  If the enforcement notice
(or bye-law) is bad (e.g., for perversity) the prosecution case is fundamentally
flawed, and the justices have no jurisdiction to convict under it.  Justices do not
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lack sufficient powers to overcome evidential problems, nor is their jurisdiction
normally lifted in "complex matters".  (43)
 Legitimate Expectation and Fairness?
 A shift in emphasis away from the  ultra vires doctrine as the constitutional
justification for judicial control of administrative action towards  a broader
theory based upon considerations of administrative fairness seems to have
found some support amongst the academics and judiciary. (44)  This approach
seems, for example,  more satisfactorily to explain decisions in which the
propriety of judicial review of (some) powers  rooted in the royal prerogative is
accepted.  (45)   The traditonal  ultra vires  doctrine which is predicated upon
obedience to Parliament  could not have been developed to produce such
results.
 This new reasoning  might permit cases like R v. Wicks and Bugg to be
questioned on the alternative grounds of a breach  of a legitimate expectation.
(46)   According to this argument, a developer could be regarded as having a
legitimate expectation of not being convicted under an invalid enforcement
notice.   Since that expectation only comes into existence  by virtue of the
criminal process (the prosecution) the duty to respect it should be regarded as
binding upon the criminal court (as opposed to the Divisional Court).  Failure to
do so might  breach the duty to act fairly.
The difficulty with this argument is what is meant by the duty to act fairly in
this context?  It might require simply that the accused is treated according to
existing legal principles. This would mean that the duty would be properly
discharged when the developer was told by the criminal court to seek redress by
way of judicial review.  This would, however, be unconvincing if judicial
review were unavailable, for example, because the time limit for an application
had expired.  Thus fairness must relate as much to the outcome as to the
procedure by which the case is administered.   If this argument  is  accepted, it
is not unreasonable to  assert that this criminal court should discharge its  duty




The  decision in R v. Wicks  seeks to abrogate the right of an individual
charged with the offence of breaching an enforcement notice  to raise the
defence that  the enforcement notice is  ultra vires.  It is a serious matter  that
such a defence   is only possible (unless  reliance is placed upon  a  patent
defect) if the accused is willing and able to bear the considerable expense of
applying for judicial review.  This  procedure is subject to strictly applied
procedural devices (such as the leave requirement and time limit), and it is not
available as of right.  It is very much open to question whether these constraints
on the availability of  judicial review  (which were  imposed for the protection
of public bodies from vexatious litigants)  were intended to be applied to curtail
the rights of the accused to make a defence in a criminal trial.
It is  also a questionable expression of legal policy  that  the right to raise a
defence (and thus avoid the imposition of a criminal sanction) should be a
matter for the discretion of the  courts.   Such a defence should be recognised as
a matter of right since it challenges an essential element in the offence charged:
the  vires of the notice under which the penalty is to be imposed.  The
possibility that an accused can  be convicted under an invalid enforcement
notice also raises concerns based on the Rule of Law.  It must be objectionable
that an accused can be subjected to a penalty under the terms of an invalid
enforcement notice which, but virtue of its ultra vires nature creates no offence.
For this reason  R v. Wicks  may not be entirely consistent with Article 7 of the
European Convention of Human Rights which provides that  "No-one shall be
held guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission  which did
not constitute a crimninal offence under national law...at the time when it was
committed."
FOOTNOTES.
(1)  Although, as will be seen below, collateral issues can be used to describe
different kinds of proceedings,  unless the context otherwise requires it, the
term   is used  here to describe proceedings the main point of which is not to
challenge the validity of the enforcement notice.   This is so where, for example
a developer accused of an offence of breaching an enforcement notice might
wish to raise the invalidity of the  notice at the criminal trial.  This is a
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collateral attack. Such challenges are of great antiquity: see, e.g.,  the Case of
the Marshalsea (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b. Collateral attack is, however, only
available where the error is jurisdictional; non-jurisdictional errors  can only be
quashed by certiorari.  This is because a court in a collateral action might not
have a jurisdiction to quash invalid administrative action (a point
misunderstood in  R v. Wicks  [1996] JPL  743 at p. 751 where the court
incorrectly reasoned that this  lack of competence made the  collateral attack of
an enforcement notice inappropriate.  This is  erroneous because if the notiice is
vitiated by jurisdictional error, it is a nullity and the criminal court merely
declares that this is so.  As a nullity it does not need to be quashed. For a
discussion of these matters see  Craig, "Administrative Law" 3rd edit. Sweet &
Maxwell (1994).  The current and widely accepted view is that the distinction
between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional error is unimportant because all
errors of law go to jurisdiction. However, as will be discussed below,  R v.
Wicks  and Bugg (infra.) reject this orthodoxy.
(2)   Per Lloyd L.J. in R v. Reading Crown Court ex p Hutchinson [1988] 1 QB
384 at p. 392.
(3)   Biographia Literaria,  J & M Dent & Sons Ltd (1975) at pp 50-52.
(4)  [1996] JPL 743.
(5)   Miller-Mead v. Minister of Housing and Local Government  [1963] 2 QB
196, especially at p. 226.
(6)  The normal procedure by which an enforcement notice is challenged is  by
way of an appeal to the Secretary of State under s.174(1) of the Town &
Country Planning Act 1990 instituted before the notice comes into effect.  The
possible grounds of appeal, which are those listed in s. 174 (2),   do not
expressly include the vires of the notice.
A further appeal lies to the High Court on a point of law under s. 289 (7). At
this stage, because the appellant is permitted to take points not raised before the
Secretary of State, it is permissible to question the vires of the notice in these
appeal proceedings:  John Pearcy Transport Ltd v. Secretary of State and
Hounslow LBC  (1987) 53 P&CR 91.  See further  Heap "An Introduction to
Planning Law" 10th edit. (1991) Sweet & Maxwell pp 264  et seq. )   However,
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it has been a fundamental principle that a citizen confronted with ultra vires
administrative action is not required to take positive steps to challenge it;
instead he may  ignore it  until prosecuted and raise the invalidity as a defence.
The importance of this principle was most recently recognised by Woolf L.J. in
Bugg v. DPP [1993] QB 473, at p. 500 notwithstanding the decision in that
case.
(7)  Either before the High Court in proceedings under s. 289 (7), or by way of
judicial review.  See generally  Wade & Forsyth, "Administrative Law"  7th
edition, Oxford  (1994), Ch .10; Craig, "Administrative Law" 3rd edit. Sweet &
Maxwell (1994) Ch. 12; Feldman, "Collateral Challenge &  Judicial Review:
the Boundary Dispute Continues",  [1993]  PL 37.
 (8)  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation
[1948] 1 KB 223.
 (9)  [1993] QB 473.
(10)   Per Webster J.,  Quietlynn v. Plymouth City Council [1988] QB 114, 131.
 (11)  O' Reilly v. Mackman  [1983] 2 AC 237.
(12)  The effect of the decision in O' Reilly v. Mackman has been widely
discussed. See for example:  Tanney: "Procedural Exclusivity in Administrative
Law" [1994] PL 51; Fredman & Morris, "The Costs of Exclusivity: Public and
Private Re-examined" [1994] PL 69; Alder "Hunting the Chimaera- the end of
O' Reilly v. Mackman" [1993] Legal Studies 183.
 (13)  RSC Ord 53 r 4 (1) provides that an application for leave must be made
promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for
the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason
for extending the period within which the application can be made.
(14)  Per Lord Diplock in O' Reilly v. Mackman  [1983] 2 AC 237 at p. 285.
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(15)  See generally Emery, "The Vires Defence"  [1992] CLJ 308 and
"Collateral Attack"  (1993) 56 MLR 643.  The Law Commission in  its Report
"Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals" Law Comm No.
226 did not directly address the  present issue concerning  collateral defences
outside  the application  for judicial review.
(16)  See Emery loc cit.  The diffculty arises because in an earlier passage Lord
Diplock stated that judicial review applies to a claim for damages   for breach
of a right in private law resulting from the invalid decision of a public body
thereby suggesting that  all "mixed cases" involving both public law and other
matters  are cases where judicial review must be sought. [1983] 2 AC 237 at p.
285.  (But see now Roy on this point [1992] 1 All ER 705)
(17)     This  reasoning was supported by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in
Wandsworth LBC  v. Winder. [1985] AC 461, at p. 510.
(18)  [1992] 1 All ER 705. Note the emarks of Lord Lowry at p.. 728-729.
(19)   [1985] AC 461
(20)   Quietlynn v. Plymouth City Council [1988] QB 114, 131.
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